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Abstract
Background: P values are the most commonly used tool to measure evidence against a hypothesis. Several
attempts have been made to transform P values to minimum Bayes factors and minimum posterior probabilities of
the hypothesis under consideration. However, the acceptance of such calibrations in clinical fields is low due to
inexperience in interpreting Bayes factors and the need to specify a prior probability to derive a lower bound on
the posterior probability.
Methods: I propose a graphical approach which easily translates any prior probability and P value to minimum
posterior probabilities. The approach allows to visually inspect the dependence of the minimum posterior
probability on the prior probability of the null hypothesis. Likewise, the tool can be used to read off, for fixed
posterior probability, the maximum prior probability compatible with a given P value. The maximum P value
compatible with a given prior and posterior probability is also available.
Results: Use of the nomogram is illustrated based on results from a randomized trial for lung cancer patients
comparing a new radiotherapy technique with conventional radiotherapy.
Conclusion: The graphical device proposed in this paper will enhance the understanding of P values as measures
of evidence among non-specialists.
Background
P values are the most commonly used tool to measure
evidence against a hypothesis [1]. The P value is defined
as the probability, under the assumption of no effect
(the null hypothesis H0), of obtaining a result equal to
or more extreme than what was actually observed. The
complexity of this definition has led to widespread mis-
interpretations and criticisms [2-5]. Indeed, P values are
often misinterpreted (a) as the probability of obtaining
the observed data under the assumption of no real
effect, (b) as an “observed” type-I error rate, (c) as the
false discovery rate, i.e. the probability that a significant
finding is “false positive”, and (d) as the (posterior)
probability of the null hypothesis [6].
The latter misinterpretation has given rise to interest-
ing work on the connection between P values and
(posterior) probabilities of the null hypothesis. Within a
Bayesian framework, the posterior probability is a func-
tion of the prior probability and the so-called Bayes
factor, which summarizes the evidence against the null
hypothesis.
Several attempts have been made to transform
P values to lower bounds on the Bayes factor and the
resulting posterior probability of the null hypothesis
[7-11]. In this context Bayes factors are usually oriented
as P values such that smaller values provide stronger
evidence against the null hypothesis. These techniques
calibrate P values such that an interpretation as mini-
mum Bayes factor or minimum posterior probability is
justified. Although the different approaches do not
result in identical calibration scales, a universal finding
i st h a tt h ee v i d e n c ea g a i n s tas i m p l en u l lh y p o t h e s i si s
by far not as strong as the P value might suggest.
However, the acceptance of calibrated P values in clin-
ical fields is low. Minimum Bayes factors have the
a d v a n t a g et h a tt h e yd on o td e p e n do nt h ep r i o rp r o b -
ability of the null hypothesis [9], but their interpretation
requires an intuitive understanding of odds, similar to
likelihood ratios in diagnostic studies [12]. Clinicians,
however, prefer to think in terms of probabilities. The
calculation of the minimum posterior probability, on the
other hand, requires to decide on a prior probability of
the null hypothesis. Fixing a prior probability may be
difficult for the clinician, who would perhaps prefer to
investigate - for a given P value - the dependence of the
Correspondence: leonhard.held@ifspm.uzh.ch
Biostatistics Unit, Institute of Social and Preventive Medicine, University of
Zurich, Hirschengraben 84, 8001 Zurich, Switzerland
Held BMC Medical Research Methodology 2010, 10:21
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/10/21
© 2010 Held; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.(minimum) posterior probability of the null hypothesis
on the prior probability.
In this paper I propose a graphical approach, which
easily translates any prior probability and P value into
minimum posterior probabilities. Likewise, the tool can
be used to derive, for fixed posterior probability, the
maximum prior probability compatible with a given
P value. The maximum P value in accordance with a
given prior and posterior probability can be also read
off. The approach is inspired by the Fagan nomogram
[13] used to derive the post-test probability in diagnostic
tests [12]. It will enhance the understanding and facili-
tate the interpretation of P values as measures of evi-
dence against the null hypothesis among non-specialists.
Methods
Calibration of P values
In a seminal paper, Edwards, Lindman and Savage [7]
(ELS) studied the relationship between P values and
minimum Bayes factors in several settings. Of particular
interest is the case where a test statistic is normal distri-
buted with unknown mean μ. A simple null hypothesis
H0 corresponds to a particular mean value μ = μ0. Calcu-
lation of the Bayes factor requires fixing a prior density
for μ under the alternative hypothesis H1: μ ≠ μ0.
This scenario reflects, at least approximately, many of
the statistical procedures found in medical journals.
The minimum Bayes factor turns out to be
BF  exp( . ), 05
2 z
here z is the z- v a l u e ,i . e .t h et e s tstatistic which has
given rise to the observed P value. This lower bound
can be derived using the fact that the Bayes factor is
minimized if the alternative hypothesis has all its prior
density at one particular value of μ s u p p o r t e dm o s tb y
the data (the Maximum Likelihood estimate). Because
this point is always on one side of the null hypothesis,
ELS suggested to use a z-value based on a one-tailed
rather than a two-tailed significance test. A two-tailed
test, which leads to slightly larger values of z and to
slightly smaller values of BF has also been suggested [9].
For a fixed prior probability q, say, of the null hypo-
thesis, the minimum Bayes factor BF can easily be trans-
formed into a lower bound on the posterior probability
of the null hypothesis based on Bayes’ theorem:
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The first row in Table 1 gives this lower bound for
q =5 0 %a n dP values of 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001, respec-
tively, using the ELS approach. A striking feature is that
the lower bound for the posterior probability is consid-
erably larger than the corresponding P value.
The ELS approach has been refined by Berger and
Sellke [8] (BS). They derived lower bounds for the Bayes
factor under more realistic families of prior distributions
for μ under the alternative hypothesis. In particular,
they considered (1) symmetric prior distributions, (2)
unimodal and symmetric prior distributions, and (3)
normal prior distributions, all centered at μ0.A so n e
would expect, the corresponding lower bounds on the
posterior probability of H0 increase with increasing
restrictions on the prior family for μ, as can be seen in
Table 1.
Perhaps the simplest and most intuitive calibration has
been suggested by Sellke, Bayarri and Berger [10] (SBB).
They use the fact that a P value is (under suitable regu-
larity conditions) uniformly distributed if H0 is true.
Under the alternative hypothesis smaller P values are
more likely than larger P values, i.e. the density of the
P value is monotonically decreasing. A flexible class of
decreasing densities on the unit interval is provided by
specific beta densities with one unknown parameter.
The minimum Bayes factor is then
BF
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Here p is the observed P value and e = exp(1) ≈ 2.718
is Euler’s constant. The resulting lower bounds on the
posterior probability of the null hypothesis are very
similar to those obtained using the BS approach with a
unimodal prior density for μ, as can be seen from
Table 1. Note that the SBB bounds hold in a more gen-
eral setting without the assumption of a beta distributed
P value under the alternative hypothesis [10]. More
recently, minimum Bayes factors for c
2-distributed test
statistics have been studied [11]. Such test statistics have
an additional parameter, the degrees-of-freedom ν,
which depends on the specific type of test applied. The
following lower bound on the Bayes factor has been
derived:
Table 1 Lower bounds on the posterior probability of the
null hypothesis for different P values and equal
prior probabilities of null and alternative hypothesis
(q = 50%).
P value
Method 0.05 0.01 0.001
Edwards, Lindman, and Savage (1963) 20.5% 6.3% 0.8%
Berger and Sellke (1987, Scenario 1) 22.7% 6.8% 0.9%
Sellke, Bayarri, and Berger (2001) 28.9% 11.1% 1.8%
Berger and Sellke (1987, Scenario 2) 29.0% 10.9% 1.8%
Berger and Sellke (1987, Scenario 3) 32.1% 13.3% 2.4%
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Here, x is the value of the c
2-test statistic which has
given rise to the observed P value. It can be easily
shown that BF decreases with increasing degrees-of-free-
dom. Perhaps more interestingly, BF is equal to the BS
lower bound for normal priors for ν = 1, equals the SBB
lower bound for ν = 2, and is equal to the ELS lower
bound for ν ® ∞. This illustrates that the range of
lower bounds on the posterior probability given in
Table 1 reflects a large variety of different tests and
scenarios.
A nomogram for P values
The apparent complexity of the formulae presented in
the previous section may be one of the reasons why the
proposed calibration of P values has not entered routine
scientific research. I therefore suggest to adapt a graphi-
cal device, originally developed for diagnostic tests [13],
to the setting outlined above. The original Fagan nomo-
gram allows to visually determine the post-test
Figure 1 A nomogram for P values. The prior probability for the null hypothesis is located on the first axis, the observed P value on the
second axis, and the minimum posterior probability on the third axis.
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hood ratio in a diagnostic test framework [12]. The like-
lihood ratio is a function of sensitivity, specificity and
the actual result of the diagnostic test considered. The
likelihood ratio is a specific form of a Bayes factor
where both hypotheses under consideration (either the
patient has the disease or not) are simple and no addi-
tional prior assumptions have to be made.
The proposed graphical device is shown in Figure 1. The
prior probability for the null hypothesis is located on the
first axis and joined to the observed P value on the second
axis. The minimum posterior probability is then read off
the third axis. The P value scaling on the second axis is
based on the SBB calibration. Of course, any other of the
calibrations discussed in the previous section could have
been used, but the SBB approach seems particularly suita-
ble since it is not designed for a specific test statistic (nor-
mal or c
2) but is derived in a more general setting.
Note that there are some notable differences com-
pared with the original Fagan nomogram. First, the
likelihood ratio is replaced with the P value. Secondly,
only P values smaller than 1/e ≈ 0.37 are considered
since BF is unity for larger P values, where there is lack
of evidence against the null hypothesis. Therefore the
Figure 2 Application to lung cancer CHART trial. For a P value of 0.3% (0.003), the lower bound on the posterior probability can be read off
the third axis for a q = 10% (green line), q = 50% (red line), and q = 90% (blue line) prior probability.
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not identical to the posterior probability scale on the
right-hand side of the plot. This reflects the fact that P
values are asymmetric measures of evidence, they quan-
tify the evidence against the null hypothesis, but they do
not quantify the evidence in favour of the null hypoth-
esis. This is different in the Fagan nomogram, where
likelihood ratios can be both larger and smaller than
unity. Finally, the third axis gives not an exact value for
the posterior probability of the null hypothesis but only
the minimum posterior probability.
Results
The proposed nomogram can be used in three different
ways, as will be illustrated by the following example. In
1986 a new radiotherapy technique called CHART was
introduced. Promising pilot studies led the UK Medical
Research Council to instigate a large randomized trial
for lung cancer patients. The objective of the study was
to estimate the change in survival when given CHART
compared with conventional radiotherapy.
Before the trial a q = 10% prior chance that CHART
would offer no survival benefit at all was elicited from
Figure 3 Application to lung cancer CHART trial. The prior probability must be 6% or smaller to obtain a lower bound of 0.3% on the
posterior probability (red line). The green line indicates, that we need a P value of 0.014% (0.00014) or smaller to reduce the probability of the
null hypothesis from q = 50% a priori to 0.3% a posteriori.
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important and statistically significant difference in survi-
val was found (9% improvement in 2 year survival, 95%
CI: 3-15%, Two-sided P value = 0.3%, i.e. 0.003) [14].
We can now easily read off the lower bound of around
0.5% for the posterior probability of the null hypothesis
(green line in Figure 2).
Due to the relatively small prior probability, the mini-
mum posterior probability of the null hypothesis is in
this example numerically quite close to the P value.
This will be different for larger prior probabilities. For
example, for q = 50% we obtain a minimum posterior
probability of no survival benefit of around 4.5% (red
line). For q = 90% the minimum posterior probability is
29.9% (blue line).
There are two other ways how to use the nomogram,
solving for either the prior probability or the P value.
For example, to obtain a posterior probability of 0.3%
with a P value of 0.3%, the prior probability must be 6%
or smaller, as can be read off from the red line in
Figure 3. Alternatively, one might be interested in the
maximum P value that is compatible with a reduction of
the probability of the null hypothesis from 50% a priori
to 0.3% a posteriori, say. Figure 3 indicates (green line)
that we need a P value of 0.014% (0.00014) or smaller to
achieve this, more than one order of magnitude smaller
than the targeted posterior probability of 0.3%.
Discussion
The Fagan nomogram [12] is widely used in the context
of diagnostic tests and I hope that the proposed nomo-
gram for P values will reach similar popularity. It
visually transforms P values to minimum posterior prob-
abilities of the null hypothesis and thus avoids compli-
cated calculations. Sensitivity with respect to prior
assumptions can be studied graphically. In addition, for
fixed posterior probability, the maximum prior probabi-
lity compatible with a given P value can be read off. The
maximum P v a l u ec o m p a t i b l ew i t hag i v e np r i o ra n d
posterior probability is also available.
As emphasized in Spiegelhalter et al. [[5], p. 130-133],
the actual posterior probability of the null hypothesis
will also depend on the power (i.e. sample size) of the
study. However, Hooper [15] has recently shown that
the evidence against the null hypothesis provided by a
precise P value does not strongly depend on power over
the range of study sizes that are commonly encountered
in clinical and epidemiological research. For illustration,
we reproduce in our Figure 4 the top panel of Figure 3
from Hooper [15], which gives the posterior probability
Figure 4 Dependence of the posterior probability on study power. Posterior probability of the null hypothesis plotted against the (pre-
study) power at the 5% significance level for P = 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 and a prior probability of q = 90%. The calculation is based on a normal
prior with standard deviation τ = 1 (left plot) and τ = 2 (right plot) under the alternative, assuming that one unit corresponds to the minimum
clinically important difference. The dashed lines indicate the minimum posterior probability as obtained from the BS (short dashed) and SBB
(long dashed) approach, respectively.
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power at the 5% significance level for P = 0.05, 0.01,
and 0.001. The calculation is based on a normal prior
with mean μ0 and standard deviation τ = 1 (left plot)
and τ = 2 (right plot) under the alternative (assuming
that one unit corresponds to the minimum clinically
important difference). This corresponds to Scenario 3
from Berger & Sellke [8]. We have added the corre-
sponding BS lower bound (short dashed) on the poster-
ior probability in Figure 4. The actual posterior
probability is quite close to this minimum for all powers
typically encountered in clinical research, say between
40% and 95%. This holds both for τ =1( l e f tp l o ti n
Figure 4) and τ = 2 (right plot). Only for very small or
very large studies the posterior probability is consider-
ably greater than the BS lower bound. The SBB bound,
given by the long dashed line, is more conservative and
hence slightly lower than the BS lower bound.
In this paper I have adopted a Bayesian approach to
calculate a lower bound on the posterior probability of
the null hypothesis, derived from a prior probability and
ap r e c i s eP value. Even Cox [[16], p. 83] agrees that
“conclusions expressed in terms of probability are on
the face of it more powerful than those expressed indir-
ectly via confidence intervals and P values. Further, in
principle at least, they allow the inclusion of a richer
pool of [prior] information.” However, Cox feels that
“conclusions derived from the frequentist approach are
more immediately secure than those derived from most
Bayesian analysis” because [prior] “information is typi-
cally more fragile or even nebulous as compared with
that typically derived more directly from the data under
analysis”. On the other hand, Goodman [1,3,6,9] argues
that the misunderstanding and misuse of P values is so
widespread that new tools are needed to properly con-
vey the strength of evidence provided by research data.
The nomogram proposed in this paper is such a tool
and is particularly useful to study sensitivity to the prior
probability of the null hypothesis, as illustrated in Figure
2. Combined with a precise P value we obtain a range of
plausible values for the posterior probability of the null
hypothesis, which is far easier to interpret than the
P value itself.
Conclusions
The graphical device proposed in this paper enhances
the understanding and facilitates the interpretation of
P values as measures of evidence against the null
hypothesis among non-specialists. For study sizes typi-
cally encountered in clinical and epidemiological
research, the posterior probability of the null hypothesis
will be quite close to the lower bound provided by the
nomogram. We are currently preparing a JAVA applet
at http://www.biostat.uzh.ch/static/pnomogram which
allows to interactively use the proposed nomogram on
the internet.
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